

November 8, 1984

--Is the Freeze to be regarded any more as "the first step?"

--Not only did we fail to "make the Freeze the issue" of the campaign...the Freeze did not even determine the votes of Freeze supporters. If 80% of the population supports the Freeze, then if this same proportion was true of the voting population (a recent study claims that the voting population holds much the same attitudes as the population at large; if Freeze supporters are more likely to vote than others, the following conclusions would be even stronger) and if the 20% of Freeze opponents all voted for Reagan, it follows that 39% of voters support the Freeze and voted for Reagan, while 41% of the voters support the Freeze and voted for the Freeze candidate, Mondale.

Actually, many Mondale supporters oppose the Freeze. (Did Brzezinski vote for Reagan?) If only half of the 20% of Freeze opponents voted for Reagan, then of the 59% who voted for Reagan, 49% support the Freeze, while 31% of the voters support the Freeze and voted for Mondale.

If only 70% support the Freeze, and 20% oppose the Freeze and voted for Reagan, then 39% support the Freeze and voted for Reagan (in either case, most of his voters must support the Freeze) while 41% support the Freeze and voted for Mondale: a 50-50 split.

--Do we believe that any of the new weapons should be built prior to or in the absence of a Freeze? Are they necessary, or even justified, in the absence of a Freeze? I.e., is the present arms budget in nuclear weapons "second-best" to a Freeze, the preferred alternative to a Freeze?

---Surely Freeze activists are clear that this is not so. Not one of the new weapons is justified either prior to or in the absence of a Freeze, **no matter what the Soviets do. The next-best alternative to a bilateral Freeze is a unilateral US rejection of every one of these weapons:** not only the MX (where a large part of Congress already agree, but ASAT, SLCMs, D-5, Midgetman, B-1 and Stealth. Every one of these is either unnecessary and wasteful or actively dangerous to our security.

Not one of these new weapons is necessary to or contributes positively to deterring Soviet nuclear attack on the US or on US forces overseas or our allies. In the case of the first-strike weapons, their existence actually lowers such deterrence.

Yet we have failed to make this judgment clear. Our slogans are worded so as to invite or permit the support of those who believe (as does Mondale!) that these programs "must" be pushed prior to the achieving of a Freeze, or if a Freeze proves

unattainable for any reason (e.g., Presidential refusal to propose it!) Thus we had "good faith" "supporters" of the Freeze Resolution in Congress voting within weeks to support the MX in 1983. Such "support" actually discredited our movement and discouraged many real supporters. Do members of the public whose attraction to the "bilateral" condition is based on this ranking of alternatives really serve our cause, either?

One reason to oppose the MX now is that it makes a Freeze harder to attain; another is that it is wasteful. But the strongest reason is that it is dangerous, and should be rejected whatever the Soviets do, and whether or not they, or the President, accept a Freeze. This is true of every one of the other weapons as well!

Was our emphasis on "bilateral and verifiable" aimed at deflecting attacks from the Administration? If so, it failed completely. (Indeed, it was probably hard to foresee that the Administration would be willing to be so brazen in labelling us as "unilateral disarmers").

The fact is that we do see a bilateral agreement--explicit or tacit--as probably attainable and strongly preferable to a unilateral halt--thus, urgently worth proposing and exploring--because new Soviet weapons **are** dangerous to both sides and important to foreclose (and **no** other approach offers any hope whatever of achieving that!) Indeed, we worry about these Soviet weapons far more than the Administration or the Labs do; we don't see their destabilizing effects adequately compensated by new US weapons. We want to avoid them, and the Freeze is the **only** way of accomplishing that.

But if we did not see a **unilateral** halt as desirable **until** a bilateral halt is achieved or in the absence of a bilateral halt, it would be because we failed to see the destabilizing (or unnecessary) character of all these new weapons, or else because we valued this destabilizing character as the basis for extended deterrence, or because we wanted to continue to subsidize the military-industrial-academic complex. (Mondale may suffer from all of these motivations).

What courses are left to us, over the next four years?

(a) Opposition to individual weapons, along with other groups; this may be "the old way," but it is in any case **necessary**.

(b) Opposition to classes of weapons: "first strike weapons", "unverifiable weapons," star wars weapons. (This covers everything except B-1 and Stealth! Perhaps these could even be accepted as an unavoidable subsidy to the aerospace industry; that is what Cranston was forced to accept!)

(c) Congressional bilateral moratoriums on testing: warheads, ballistic missiles, ASAT (Quick Freeze).

(d) Opposition to intervention. (This might even include opposition to B-1 and Stealth, according to Klare)

--A fake alternative, in my opinion, is Congressional enactment of a full comprehensive Freeze on production, deployment and testing, which would merely evoke an "authoritative" Presidential finding that none of these is verifiable.